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Abstract 
Over the past few years, considerable interest has been paid to the way in which social 
expectations (hopes, hypes, fears) about new genomic technologies help shape, and in 
themselves are shaped by, emerging technologies, regulatory regimes and social 
concerns.  In comparison, little attention has been paid to the role of expectations in 
related, but non-scientific discourses, such as bioethics. Drawing on a review of 
publications addressing the ethical issues associated with pharmacogenetics, this 
paper presents a detailed critique of bioethicists’ contribution to these debates. The 
review highlights how, almost a decade after bioethical debate around 
pharmacogenetics started, and in contrast to the professions’ self-perception as a form 
of regulator, bioethicists still largely restrict themselves to reviews of possible ethical 
issues raised by this technology, rather than critiquing others’ positions and arguing 
for specific points of view. In addition the paper argues that bioethicists tend to: 
accept unquestioningly scientists’ expectations about the development and ethical 
issues raised by pharmacogenetics; ignore contributions from bioethicists who do 
question these expectations; and engage in an ethical debate, the boundaries of which 
have been laid down and defined by academic and industry scientists. The paper 
concludes by offering some possible explanations for why the bioethical discourse has 
taken this form. 
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Introduction 
Over the past few years sociologists have become increasingly interested in bioethics. 
At one level, this interest centres on the ways in which social science research can 
contribute to how bioethics goes about its business, what Ray DeVries calls 
‘sociology in bioethics’ (De Vries, 2003. See also Hoffmaster, 1992; DeVries and 
Conrad, 1998; Kleinman, 1999) and what others have labelled ‘critical bioethics’ 
(Hedgecoe, 2004). But taking this interest further, a number of authors have taken 
bioethics as an actual site for sociological study (Bosk, 1999; Evans, 2000; Stevens, 
2000; Wolpe, 2000; Messikomer, Fox and Swazey, 2001; Evans, 2002). This article 
aims to contribute to this latter area of research by exploring the bioethical discourse 
surrounding a new technology, called pharmacogenetics, and proposing sociological 
explanations for why this discourse has taken the form it has.  
 
Pharmacogenetics, the use of genetic tests to help develop and prescribe drugs, has 
generated a great deal of interest over the past few years, both on the part of 
pharmaceutical companies (Roses, 2002; Lindpaintner, 2003a/b) – who are thought to 
be channelling billions of dollars into research in this area (Lehman Brothers, 2001; 
PriceWaterHouse Coopers, 2005) – and academic scientists (Evans and Relling, 1999; 
Mancinelli, Cronin and Sadée, 2000; Persing and Cheek, 2000; Weinshilbourn, 2003; 
Burkee and Psaty, 2007; Piquette-Miller and Grant, 2007). Unsurprisingly, this topic 
has generated considerable debate over the ethical issues that might be raised by the 
increased use of genetic testing that would result from the expansion of 
pharmacogenetics and it is this literature that this article will examine. Going further, 
if, as one author has claimed, ‘pharmacogenetics serves as a battlefield par excellence 
for the bioethicists’ (Sutrop, 2004: v), this study we may in turn reveal some wider 
facets of bioethics as a way of thinking about new science and technology. 
 
 
Theoretical Background 
Since it appeared as a term in the early 1970s (Potter, 1971) bioethics has taken a 
number of forms. While general definitions describe it as ‘the systematic study of the 
moral dimensions – including moral vision, decisions, conduct and policies – of the 
life sciences and health care, employing a variety of ethical methodologies in an 
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interdisciplinary setting’ (Reich, 1995 quoted in Jonsen, 1998: vii), there are other 
ways of classifying and defining bioethics, not least those places where bioethical 
debate take place. This approach underpins John Evans’ useful distinction between 
Foundational, Clinical and Public bioethics. Foundational bioethics focuses on how 
topics of concern relate to issues such as theoretical systems of ethics or democratic 
values. Clinical bioethics, in comparison, which concerns interactions with patients or 
research participants, tends to take place within healthcare settings while public 
bioethics which is concerned with setting policies about bioethical topics to apply to 
all members of a particular society, is located in the public space, encompassing 
regulators, government sanctioned advisory commissions, as well as the media, 
academics, pressure groups and face to face discussions between individuals (Evans, 
2006: 214). 
 
In these terms, this article focuses on debates within public bioethics; although the 
protagonists are (largely) academics and bioethicists are defined in terms of their 
disciplinary background (philosophy for example) or affiliation with departments or 
research centres that define themselves as bioethics related (rather than through 
membership of public bioethics commissions) the focus of the debate around 
pharmacogenetics is not on basic bioethical theory or principles (as foundational 
bioethics would be) but rather on the broader policy and public responses that might 
arise with the development of this technology. And in this context, ‘public bioethics’ 
can be seen as serving two distinct, though often complementary roles: as a form of 
regulation, and for scanning the ‘ethical horizon’. 
 
What is Bioethics for? 
The first role for bioethics concerns the identification and elucidation of possible 
ethical issues associated with new technologies, what we might call ethical ‘horizon 
scanning’. As Magrit Sutrop notes in a guest editorial for the journal Bioethics, 
‘ethicists have an important job in identifying potential problems before they will 
actually emerge in reality’ (Sutrop, 2004: vi). The aim here is to prepare society for 
newly developed/ing technologies and the challenges they bring. This, slightly 
speculative aspect to bioethics has a long tradition, evolving out of bioethics’ origins 
in concerns raised by new technologies in the 1960s, although it has not gone 
unchallenged, with Ruth Clayton, in her review of Jonathan Glover’s classic text 
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What sort of People should there be? noting that she was ‘irritated…by his inclusion 
of all imaginable outcomes; wholesale extrapolations from current techniques without 
consideration of the biological realities and the contexts in which biological systems 
operate’ (Clayton, 1986: 163). While Clayton was a biologist, similar concerns about 
bioethicists’ uncritical acceptance of scientific futures have been expressed more 
recently from within the bioethics community (Elliott, 2005). Despite these cautions, 
a key role for bioethics remains the identification and exploration of the ethical 
problems raised by new and emerging technologies, such as human cloning, stem cell 
research and nanotechnology. 
 
The second role for bioethics is as a form of regulation. A good statement of such an 
approach might be:   
‘Bioethics is an important non-legal regulatory feature in areas such as 
reproductive and end of life issues…as well as genetic testing, manipulation, 
and data storage. Its norms also attempt to regulate the conduct of scientific 
research, access to and quality and safety of technology, medical services, 
essential medicines, and other preconditions for health’ (Faunce, 2005: 173) 
While the idea of bioethics as regulation is not often explicitly proposed by 
bioethicists themselves, one can detect a strong element of this approach in, for 
example, the words of Daniel Callahan – co-founder of one of the earliest bioethics 
institutions The Hastings Centre – from 1977:  
‘Doctors want...to make all the choices. Well, we’re saying to them no. There 
are some public interests at stake here and some general principles you have to 
abide by...You’re playing in a public ball-park now...and you’ve got to live by 
certain standards...like it or not’ (cited in Stevens, 2000: 52-53). 
While bioethicists may be unwilling to explicitly adopt the mantel of regulators, 
previous social scientific research in this area highlights how easily they slip into this 
role. For example Lewins has outlined how, in debates over euthanasia, bioethics 
serves as a form of social control over the medical profession (Lewins, 1998). On a 
broader stage, Brian Salter has explored how, in the wake of a collapse in public trust 
of technocratic scientific opinion, bioethics (mainly in the form of public bioethics 
commissions) has become a form of political legitimation for decision-making around 
controversial technologies (Salter and Jones, 2002,, 2005; Salter, 2007). 
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Perhaps the most detailed evidence of bioethics’ regulatory impulse is provided in 
Renée Fox and Judith Swazey’s historico-ethnographic study of the origins and 
development of American bioethics and its institutions. They note the way in which 
traditional histories of bioethics centre on the discipline’s emergence in the 1960s in 
the context of the social challenges presented by new technologies (such as organ 
transplantation) as well as perceived bad behaviour on the part of medical 
professionals. The consequent need to control and regulate the behavior of others’ 
reached its peak in the symbiotically close relationship between specific academic 
bioethicists and the committee drawing up federal regulations for the oversight of 
human subjects research (Fox and Swazey, 2008). 
 
A key part of the bioethical toolkit in its role as regulator is philosophical argument, 
the taking and defence of a particular intellectual position, the analysis and critique of 
alternative points of view. Without making an argument for a particular point of view, 
it becomes very hard for a bioethicist to tell other people what it is they should, or 
should not, be doing. This is, of course, a very broad position, and does not presume 
that there is any one correct way to make such a bioethical argument: it may involve 
the application of a bioethical theory (such as principalism), but then again, it may 
not. It may be as straightforward as unpicking the logic underpinning other people’s 
positions. What matters is that, while acting as an informal regulator, a bioethicist has 
to argue for a particular position and, probably, disagree with alternatives. 
 
Of course, the roles of regulation and horizon scanning are not mutually exclusive, 
and they can be seen as feeding into or influencing each other. For example, in their 
critique of horizon scanning – what they call ‘prophetic bioethics’ – Guyer and 
Moreno chastise bioethicists for lazily accepting science fiction scenarios in place of 
realistic science, and as a consequence of ‘ignoring the biological red flags of cloning 
in favour of ethical ruminations that lead nowhere useful, bioethicists disavow their 
role in providing oversight…to contemporary science and medicine’ (Guyer and 
Moreno, 2004: W16). The remainder of this article explores how bioethicists have 
gone about fulfilling these two roles in the case of one specific technology, 
pharmacogenetics . 
 
Sample 
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Using database searches on Pubmed and Web of Science, supplemented by manual 
searches of the literature 52 English-language articles were identified which were 
primarily about the (bio)ethics of pharmacogenetics or pharmacogenomics.
1
 It is 
important to note that these articles are bioethics articles (i.e. excluding health 
economics or policy) about pharmacogenetics, rather than reviews of 
pharmacogenetics which happen to mention ethical issues at some point. This latter 
category of article is interesting and is an important way for scientists to discuss the 
ethics of this technology (Hedgecoe and Martin, 2003) but is outside the scope of this 
article. Similarly, the articles have pharmacogenetics/omics as their focus, rather than 
broader topics such as ‘post-genomic medicine’ or ‘personalised medicine’ which 
practice runs showed produced large numbers of irrelevant material, and few articles 
not covered by the chosen search terms. In addition, this approach avoids edited 
collections (such as Rothstein, 2003) and the reports of bioethics commission (e.g. 
Nuffield Council, 2003) since their length, multi-authored nature, and non-peer 
reviewed status makes comparison with journal articles difficult.
2
 
 
Method and Analysis 
Methodologically this paper provides a critical literature review of articles explicitly 
addressing the ethics of pharmacogenetics, sharing some methodological features with 
Anne Kerr’s comprehensive analysis of debates around the genetics of cystic fibrosis 
(2000) or Hedgecoe and Martin’s (2003) previous work on pharmacogenetics. To aid 
analysis a form of broad qualitative textual analysis was used focusing on the 
presence, extent and manner in which specific ethical topics are discussed in relation 
to pharmacogenetics. The aim was not to count every instance of a particular word, 
phrase or theme prior to statistical analysis, but rather to assess more 
impressionistically how fully a particular ethical topic has been handled in a particular 
paper.  The articles reviewed in this analysis are listed in the annex to this paper. 
When these articles are referenced, [square brackets] are used, to distinguish from 
articles in the bibliography. 
 
Article content is classified according to a mixed-scale which incorporates both the 
extent to which the article discusses a particular topic, and whether an argument or 
specific recommendation is made. Any single article can obviously contain a mixture 
of categories if it covers a number of different topics in varying depth.  At the bottom 
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end of the scale is a ‘mention’, a brief appearance by a topic with no further 
discussion. For example the underlined text below counts as a ‘mention’ of 
stigmatisation:  
‘The social consequences that arise from new disease labels and their 
legitimization would obviously involve interpersonal stigmatization or identity 
issues. In addition, a wider range of possible societal concerns, such as those 
related to access to insurance, employment and health-care resources, will 
probably emerge’ [Issa, 2002: 306]. 
The ethical topic, in this case the possibility that pharmacogenetics might lead to the 
stigmatisation of some people, is mentioned in the text but there is no discussion or 
presentation of possible issues and the author moves onto the next topic (insurance) 
immediately.  
 
This is followed on the scale by an ‘overview’, which provides more information on a 
topic, often in the form of a series of questions. For example, an overview of the 
issues raised for family members is provided in the following text: 
‘If family members were then to request testing, should testing be made 
available to them? Or should information be disclosed only on the condition 
that they agree not to be tested? If they were tested and found to be 
homozygous for the E4 allele, indicating possible susceptibility, what would 
be the consequences of reclassifying surrogate decision makers as ‘at risk’? 
Such questions are not easily resolved’ [Issa and Keyserlingk, 2000: 920] 
It is typical of such an ‘overview’ that while questions might be asked, little or no 
attempt is made to answer them.  
 
Text that ‘reviews’ a topic provides more information than an overview, discusses the 
pros and cons of particular positions but, crucially, tends not argue for a particular 
point of view. For example, March, Cheeseman and Docherty [2001] provide a 
detailed review of national and international laws and regulations concerning data 
protection as they relate to pharmacogenetic research. Yet by and large they avoid 
drawing critical conclusions regarding the effectiveness or otherwise of these different 
regulations, aside from some broad warnings at the end of the paper about such 
regulations not delaying or preventing potentially beneficial research. 
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Finally texts that make ‘arguments’ take a particular position with regard to some 
aspect of  pharmacogenetics and often criticise other positions. One of the best 
examples in this sample comes from Weijer and Miller who argue for a position 
(concerning community informed consent), dispute the views of others (a group called 
the Pharmacogenetics Consortium) and make a number of recommendations: 
 ‘we think it essential that communities be extended protections that allow for 
their respectful involvement in research...Regrettably, the Pharmacogenetics 
Consortium’s treatment of communities is deficient in a number of respects...’ 
[Weijer and Miller, 2003: 3. Emphasis added] 
Occasionally more policy minded authors will make a series of ‘recommendations’, 
which suggest particular courses of action but which tend to lack the detail of 
‘arguments’. When such recommendations are based on closely worded analysis this 
is not a problem [e.g. Clarke, English, Harris, and Wells, 2001]. But when they are 
based on a more stripped-down ‘wish-list’ of ethical goals [e.g. Temporary 
Committee on Human Genetics and Other New Technologies of Modern Medicine, 
2002] the putative value of such an article is perhaps harder to argue for.
3
 
 
This classification scheme fits the two central roles for bioethics identified above. 
Arguments and recommendations are crucial to bioethics’ regulatory role, since they 
are essential in analysing situations, dilemmas and technologies and advising people 
on right and wrong decisions. Articles which provide information about ethical issues 
arising from this new technology are fulfilling the horizon scanning role, with an 
implicit assumption that more detail and discussion is better. An article which 
identifies and discusses new ethical issues is fulfilling a role (horizon scanning) as 
much as one that argues for a particular position does (regulation), so the 
classification scheme does not necessarily prioritise ‘Arguments’ over ‘Reviews’. 
And of course these classifications can occur in the same articles; an article consisting 
largely of a detailed review of specific issues may lead up to a well constructed 
argument. 
 
When it came to classifying the authors of these articles, a simple scheme classing 
them as ‘scientists’, ‘social scientists’, or ‘ethicists’ was used. ‘Scientists’ includes 
clinicians, pharmacists and even, in the case of Tom Wilkie [Spallone & Wilkie, 
2000], a physicist and former science journalist, and social scientists were few in 
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number and clear in their disciplinary affiliation.  Ethicists (which for the purposes of 
this article includes lawyers and policy researchers) is a more contentious act of 
classification. The obvious problem is, as Carl Elliot has wryly noted, that no one 
wants to be called a bioethicist (Elliott, 2002). For the purposes of this analysis, 
people were categorised on the basis of disciplinary training (a Ph.D. in philosophy 
designates an ethicist for example), and/or departmental affiliation (someone who 
works in a centre for bioethics, is classed as a bioethicist). But, as STS has long 
taught, such classifications are not cut and dried. For example, Amalia Issa wrote 
some of the first papers on the ethics of pharmacogenetics [2000; 2001] was trained in 
neuroscience with a Ph.D. in Neurology and Neurosurgery at McGill University. Yet 
in 2000, when two of her papers were published, she held a postdoctoral position in 
the Biomedical Ethics Unit at McGill University and she had completed a fellowship 
in Medical Ethics from the Division of Medical Ethics at Harvard Medical School. 
For the purposes of this article, she counts as an ethicist. A similar issue was raised by 
Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, who has a background in Anthropology, but who is based at the 
Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics, and who is classed as a bioethicist.  
 
Results 
In terms of the general characteristics of the sample, of the 51 articles where authors 
could be clearly identified
4
, 38 of them were authored, or co-authored by bioethicists, 
with 11 of these being co-authored with scientists and only 2 with social scientists. 
Thus, as we might expect, bioethicist (co-)authored articles make up a majority of 
those sampled, although with 24 articles – 12 of them (co-)authored with other 
scientists and 11, as previously mentioned with ethicists – scientists have also 
contributed to this literature in a noticeable way. In terms of the nature of their 
contribution, it is clear that when bioethicists write about pharmacogenetics, articles 
consisting almost solely of ‘mentions’ are rare [i.e. Mordini, 2004]. Rather they tend 
to offer broad overviews [e.g. Issa, 2000; Rothstein & Epps, 2001; Alcalde & 
Rothstein, 2002] or reviews [e.g. Robertson, 2001; Buchanan, Califano, Kahn, 
McPherson, Robertson, & Brody, 2002; Vaszar, Cho, and Raffin, 2003; Lushoff and 
de Wert, 2004; Morely and Hall, 2004; Lee, 2005b; Lushoff, 2006] of a number of 
ethical topics which might arise with the application of this technology.  
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One justification for this comes from Weijer and Miller who note that such broad 
summaries are ‘essential for defining the range of issues that ought to be addressed, 
[and] the time has come for detailed investigation of specific [ethical] problems’ 
[Weijer & Miller, 2003: 1]. If this is the case, we might expect such ‘broad brush’ 
approaches to these issues to change over time, with a steady increase in articles that 
argue for specific positions and recommendations. This does not seem to have 
happened. The 20 articles containing arguments or recommendations identified as 
being (co-) authored by ethicists are spread fairly evenly between 1999-2008, with 
one incidence in each year apart from 2001 and 2004 (4 and 5 articles respectively), 
2003 (3 articles) and 2005 (2 articles). The past 3 years (2006-2008) have had only 1 
‘argument’ article each. [Chadwick, 1999; Issa, 2000; Thomas, 2001; Renegar, Rieser 
and Manasco, 2001; Issa, 2001; Rothstein and Epps, 2001; Freund and Wilfrond, 
2002; Paul and Roses, 2003; Williams-Jones and Corrigan, 2003; Weijer and Miller, 
2003; Morely and Hall, 2004; Mordini, 2004; Netzer and Biller-Andorno, 2004;  
Shubert, 2004; Neil and Craigie, 2004; Lunshof, 2005; Lee, 2005a; Joly and 
Knoppers, 2006; Marx Stöting, 2007; Bolt et al, 2008] There does not seem to have 
been an increase in the numbers of articles by bioethicists arguing for specific 
positions, as the possible range of ethical topics has been ‘mapped out’. Thus while 
there are a number of excellent, argumentative bioethics papers present in the 
literature [e.g. Chadwick, 1999; Weijer & Miller, 2003; Schubert, 2004] this does not 
seem to be part of a growing trend. 
 
The next two sections discuss in detail how this review relates to the two roles for 
bioethics identified earlier. 
 
Crowded Horizons 
One obvious way of assessing horizon scanning is to explore whether, when 
bioethicists perform this role, they reveal possible ethical problems with a technology 
that have not been mentioned before. Thus one aspect of horizon scanning is the 
identification of novel ethical issues. Yet in the specific case of pharmacogenetics, 
there is already some evidence that, at the very least, bioethicists are not the only ones 
involved in horizon scanning. In their review of the scientific literature on 
pharmacogenetics, Hedgecoe and Martin noted that:  
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‘discussion of the ethics of pharmacogenetics is mainly organized within the 
scientific community... the construction of a bioethics discourse around 
pharmacogenetics is mainly being shaped by researchers advocating the 
development of the technology and is closely tied to the creation of scientific 
and commercial expectations. (Hedgecoe and Martin, 2003: 351) 
 
It is clear that the overviews and reviews provided by ethicists and scientists are 
largely interchangeable in terms of their concerns, the issues raised and way in which 
problems are framed. Bioethicists tend not to introduce ethical theories – often seen as 
the hallmark of bioethical thinking – in their reviews/overviews of these topics. For 
example, comparing the following two overviews of privacy/confidentiality, by an 
ethicist and scientist respectively, little difference can be seen between the overall 
tone or detail: 
- ‘Keywords are privacy and confidentiality, and the means for safeguarding 
that are various modes of de-identification, the option of withdrawl, strict 
limitation of access, storage, and use of data’ [Lunshof, 2006: 188] 
- ‘The distinctive DNA content of an individual has been likened to a ‘future 
diary’, containing potentially deterministic information regarding the health 
and well-being of a person…large consequences may result for the usefulness 
of genotypic data in a pharmacogenomic context if complete anonymization is 
required’ [Landon, 2006:30]. 
 
Analysis of the ethics literature around pharmacogenetics suggests that where it is 
hard to find an ethical feature of pharmacogenetics discussed by a bioethicist that has 
not first been discussed by a scientist (see Table 1), this is in large part because, as has 
been noted, scientists have written about the ethics of pharmacogenetics in both 
scientific review articles and in papers specifically focussed on the ethics of 
pharmacogenetics. 
 
Table 1: Common ethical topics in pharmacogenetics 
Topic 1st mentioned by scientist: 1st mentioned 
by ethicist: 
Race [Motulsky, 1978];  Lindpaintner, 1999 [Issa, 2000] 
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Privacy [Motulsky, 1978]; Lindpaintner, 1999 [Issa, 2000]  
Stigmatisation [Motulsky, 1978]; Anderson, Fitzgerald & Manasco,  1999 [Issa, 2000] 
Orphan drugs Maitland van der zee , de Boer and Leufkens, 2000 [Thomas, 2001] 
 
Exceptions are the topic of the overlap between disease genes and pharmacogenetic 
indicators which was introduced in 1999 by both Ruth Chadwick [1999] and the 
pharmacist Wolfgang Sadee (1999) and informed consent which was discussed by 
both non-ethicists [Spallone & Wilkie,, 2000] and ethicists [Issa, 2000] in 2000. Even 
setting aside the remarkable foresight of Arno Motulsky’s 1978 paper, it is clear that 
scientists are responsible for setting the parameters of the bioethics debate 
surrounding pharmacogenetics. Because scientists can discuss ethical issues in 
scientific review articles as well as bioethics papers, they have managed to gain an 
early presence in the ethical discourse in this area. One might expect bioethicists 
following in scientists’ footsteps to engage in a process of ‘sifting’ or ‘high lighting’ 
those concerns they feel ought to be prioritised. Yet ethicists cover the same topics as 
scientists, and do not seem to draw out specific issues as worthy of notice. And it is 
not that these are the only ethical issues to do with pharmacogenetics; there is the 
option that bioethicists could ‘forge ahead’ of the scientists’ view of the ethical issues, 
pushing the limits of what counts as an ethical issue in pharmacogenetics. There are a 
number of obvious ethical issues in pharmacogenetics which have not been addressed, 
including: the nontherapeutic nature of pharmacogenetic trials where DNA is sampled 
and stored for some unspecified future use or problems over the clinical validity of 
experimental pharmacogenetic tests. While these may be topics of debate in bioethical 
discussion of other technologies (DNA banks for example), this is not the case in 
pharmacogenetics. For some reason the topics that bioethicists’ discuss tend to remain 
within the discursive limits previously laid down by scientists.  
 
One possible explanation for this lies in the relationship between bioethics and the 
kinds of socio-technical expectations that scientists create to garner support for their 
work. A growing body of research has documented how such expectations or 
promissory claims are created, sustained and developed, and how, in turn, they shape 
the kinds of technologies that actually come to fruition (Martin, 1999; Brown, Rappert 
and Webster, 2000; van Lente and Rip, 1998; Hedgecoe, 2003; Nerlich and Halliday, 
2007). While I accept that it is a contentious claim, I wish to suggest that because 
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bioethicists tend to buy into scientists’ expectations about the development of a 
technology – not least of all because they too have an interest in that future, with all 
its tricky ethical problems coming to pass – there is also the chance of ‘slippage’, with 
bioethicists also accepting scientists claims about the ethical future, i.e. the ethical 
issues raised by pharmacogenetics. Of course to suggest that it is in a particular 
group’s interests to hold a particular position does not imply that there is some kind of 
conscious, grand conspiracy on the part of members of that group to promote that 
point of view. SSK has long shown how groups promote intellectual positions that 
bolster their own interests without the need to posit conspiracies. The same is true in 
the case of bioethics and the promotion of scientists’ visions of how the 
pharmacogenetics will develop. 
 
In an attempt to support this claim, it is not unreasonable to suppose that one aspect of 
bioethics’ ‘horizon scanning’ role is the creation of expectations about the 
development of technology, specifically the creation of expectations that include a 
space for bioethics. Thus in the case of pharmacogenetics, there is a need for 
bioethicists to suggest that pharmacogenetics be seen as a real, serious technology, 
and thus something worthy of ethical debate. This is why bioethics articles on 
pharmacogenetics tend to echo the way in which scientific review articles bolster 
expectations around this technology, assuming that it will come into everyday clinical 
use. It is not that bioethicists are incapable of taking a critical position regarding the 
science of pharmacogenetics, see Ruth Chadwick’s work for example [Chadwick, 
1999], yet this kind of approach, which is sceptical about the scientific expectations 
being generated around pharmacogenetics is not widely represented among 
bioethicists. 
 
A good example of the way in which bioethicists mirror scientific expectations around 
pharmacogenetics can be seen in the way in which the topic of Adverse Drug 
Reactions (ADRs) is discussed. The idea that pharmacogenetics will reduce the 
incidence of adverse drug reactions is crucial to some scientists’ visions about how 
this technology will develop (Anderson, Fitzgerald and Manasco, 1999; Lau and 
Sakul, 2000; Meyer, 2000; Ginsburg and McCarthy, 2001; Akhtar, 2002; Eichelbaum, 
Ingelman-Sundberg and Evans, 2006) and these authors frequently cite a particular 
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review article (Lazarou, Pomeranz and Corey, 1998) which emphasises the serious 
nature of ADRs for healthcare systems.  
 
The same pattern can be found amongst bioethicists who cite this paper in support of 
pharmacogenetics’ potential public health benefits, and hence an ethical reason for its 
development [e.g. Issa, 2000; Rothstein & Epps, 2001; Thomas, 2001; Issa, 2002; 
Lee, 2003; van Delden, Bolt, Kalis, Derijks, & Leufkens, 2004; Mordini, 2004; Neil 
and Craigie, 2004; Joly and Knoppers, 2006; Lee, 2007; Peterson-Iyer, 2008].
5
 Thus 
while some bioethicists are sceptical in their discussions of this topic [Chadwick, 
1999; Williams-Jones & Corrigan, 2003; Vaszar, Cho, & Raffin, 2003], a large 
number uncritically accept a key vision of this technology which centres on the public 
health problems presented by ADRs and pharmacogenetics’ potential in their solution. 
For ethical debates, the ADR issue is an important support for arguments in favour of 
this technology, underlining the direct public health benefits that will result from the 
introduction of pharmacogenetics. If pharmacogenetics stops direct physical harm to 
large numbers of people, then its ethical status is obviously bolstered. 
 
Not only do they propose the same expectations, bioethicists also mirror scientists’ 
reluctance to question the role of ADRs in the phamacogenetic future. Like scientists, 
bioethicsts ignore the lack of an obvious link between Lazarou and colleague’s study 
and the idea that pharmacogenetics will provide a solution to the public health 
problems raised by ADRs. The study itself never mentions pharmacogenetics, 
genetics or genomics and a cursory reading of the scientific literature reveals that, as 
things currently stand, we do not know what proportion of common ADRs could be 
avoided with the widespread use of pharmacogenetics (Phillips, Veenstra, Oren, Lee 
& Sadée, 2001). Bioethicists ignore more recent research which suggests that around 
two-thirds of current ADRs could be avoided with improved prescribing practice, 
without the need to introduce pharmacogenetic testing (Pirmohamed, et al, 2004).
6
  
 
Even if one does not think that it is bioethics’ job to critically question the content of 
science – something that is open to debate given that there are a number of examples 
where this has happened (Schüklenk, Mertz and Richters, 1995; Robert, 2000; Kahn, 
2006) as well as the previously noted internal critique that opposes ‘buying into’ 
scientific futures unchallenged – it is hard to ignore the way in which bioethicists’ 
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discourse around the future development of pharmacogenetics strongly mirrors that of 
scientists engaged in promoting positive expectations about this technology. Indeed 
on occasion, bioethicists go beyond what scientists themselves might claim. For 
example, Mordini [2004: 375] suggests that ‘We are rapidly advancing towards the 
post-genomic era in which genetic information will be a part of our everyday life’ and 
Issa [2002: 300] that pharmacogenetics ‘will also profoundly change the way in which 
clinical drug trials are conducted’. Yet compared to Klaus Lindpaintner of Roche, a 
man paid to promote this technology, their expectations seem somewhat over the top: 
‘pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics...are commonly touted as heralding a 
‘revolution’ in medicine, yet as soon as one begins to probe more carefully, little 
substance is yet to be found to support these enthusiastic claims’ (Lindpaintner, 
2003a: 142). While Lindpaintner might have some strategic reasons for moderating 
expectations around the development of this technology (cf Hedgecoe, 2001: 893-898 
on the genetics of Schizophrenia) there are other critical voices in the scientific 
literature, casting doubt on fundamental of aspects of pharmacogenetics, which are 
entirely absent from bioethical debates (Coats, 2000; Sam, 2004. For a critique of the 
structures involved see Nightingale and Martin, 2004).  
 
Because bioethics needs to reinforce the technical expectations around a particular 
technology, for without the impending appearance of a new technology what need is 
there for pressing discussion of the ethical issues it raises, it becomes relatively 
straightforward for slippage to occur and for bioethicists to uncritically adopt 
scientists’ ethical expectations about the kinds of issues that this technology will 
raise, thus undermining their role of ‘horizon scanning’. One consequence of this is 
the odd situation where bioethicists' discussions of the ethics of pharmacogenetics are 
not obviously written by people with specific skills or training in ethical analysis, a 
situation resulting from the structural aspects of bioethics publications (at least on 
pharmacogenetics); for whatever reason, the bioethics literature is tilted towards the 
production of these reviews (rather than articles that argue for specific positions), 
resulting in an emphasis upon horizon scanning, and scanning a horizon that has 
already been mapped out by scientists at that 
 
Limited arguments 
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Of the 20 out of 38 articles authored or co-authored by bioethicists that engage in 
some sort of argument, 13 could be said to make more than a cursory attempt to make 
a particular case [Chadwick, 1999; Issa, 2000; Renegar, Rieser and Manasco, 2001; 
Issa, 2001; Freund and Wilfrond, 2002; Paul and Roses, 2003; Williams-Jones and 
Corrigan, 2003; Weijer and Miller, 2003; Netzer and Biller-Andorno, 2004;  Shubert, 
2004; Lunshof, 2005; Lee, 2005a; Joly and Knoppers, 2006]. An example of the kind 
of detailed argument contained in one of these 12 can be found in one of Sandra Soo-
Jin Lee’s articles [Lee, 2005a] which moves from introducing genomics and the 
drivers of pharmacogenomics to a critical review of the factors producing what she 
calls an ‘infrastructure of racialization’. Focusing on the role pharmacogenomics 
might play in this racialization of medicine she highlights the disputed nature of race 
within medicine, leading onto criticism of various regulatory authorities (e.g. the FDA 
in the case of BiDil) and arguing for a need to balance market interests with 
distributive justice. In contrast, a cursory argument is provided by Mordini [2004] 
who after a brief outline of orphan drug legislation suggests that ‘We need new 
regulatory measures to encourage the development of clinically desirable but 
economically unprofitable medicines’ [p.378]. While they may argue for the same 
point, there are noticeable differences between these articles in terms of the range of 
sources drawn upon, the case made to support a particular argument and the attention 
paid to competing positions. 
 
There is no way of knowing whether with around a third of their articles making 
decent arguments, bioethicists are fulfilling their role as informal regulators in the 
ethical debates around pharmacogenetics, yet these minority of arguments could be 
contrasted with the seeming way in which when scientists make ethically provocative 
claims, bioethicists tend not to challenge them. Most ethics articles written by 
scientists cover the same sorts of topics as bioethicists’ and in the same sorts of ways 
(i.e. mentions, overviews and the occasional review). Yet some scientists make very 
strong arguments for particular ethical positions, points which, while one might not 
agree with, certainly contribute to the intellectual debate surrounding this technology. 
For example, Klaus Lindpaintner of the pharmaceutical company Roche accepts that 
there is an overlap between pharmacogenetic and ‘traditional’ disease genetic testing. 
Yet he concludes that ‘Rather than treating genetic information as a special form of 
medical information, standards of confidentiality and individual choice regarding the 
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use of all types of medical data need to be established and/or redefined. Ultimately, 
society will benefit most by simultaneously acting to protect not so much the privacy 
of medical information, but the way it is used’ (Lindpaintner, 1999: 488). His point, 
not so much challenging genetic exceptionalism but rather seeking to redefine 
standards of medical confidentiality to make pharmaceutical research easier is clearly 
open to challenge by bioethicists yet seems to have been overlooked. Similar points 
could be made about academic pharmacist Julie Johnson’s  claim that while ‘There 
are also myriad ethical, social and legal considerations...these fields need to keep in 
step with the scientific advances so that once the scientific data support wider use of 
pharmacogenetics information in the clinical setting, these nonscientific issues do not 
present barriers to its actual application’ (Johnson, 2003: 665). One interpretation of 
this position is that Johnson is suggesting that ethical and legal concerns are 
irrelevant, once the science of pharmacogenetics has got it right. This seems, at the 
very least, open to question from a bioethical position; that it has not been addressed, 
may just be a feature of bioethics publications, that they take longer to write and 
publish, or suggestive of a wider reluctance on the part of bioethicists to actually 
engage with others’ positions, at least with regard to pharmacogenetics. 
 
In addition, it is clear that that even some of those articles which make a long and 
sustained argument for a particular position could be seen as problematic in terms of 
originality. The clearest example of this can be found in Netzer and Biller-Andorno’s 
paper in the pharmacogenetics special issue of Bioethics [2004]. In many ways this is 
an excellent example of bioethics; a collaborative paper between a scientist and an 
ethicist which covers the scientific ground with confidence. The problem comes with 
this paper’s core claim to originality:  
‘So far little attention has been paid to the possibility that the routine 
application of pharmacogenetic testing could result in considerable harm to 
patients...We have emphasised that they [i.e. pharmacogenetic tests] will 
sometimes contain important secondary information as well’ [p. 345 & 350 
emphasis added]. 
While they do not explicitly claim to be the only people who have argued this, it is 
peculiar, disingenuous even, not to point out that this same point about disease 
gene/pharmacogenetic overlap has been widely discussed by scientists (Bell, 1997; 
Lichter and Kurth, 1997; Persidis, 1998; Anderson, Fitzgerald and Manasco, 1999; 
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Moyses, 1999; Lindpaintner, 1999 & 2003a; Lindpaintner, Foot, Caulfield, and Hall, 
2001) [Vaszar, Rosen, and Raffin, 2002], bioethicists [Chadwick, 1999; Robertson, 
2001; van Delden, Bolt, Kalis, Derijks, & Leufkens, 2004] and sociologists 
(Hedgecoe and Martin, 2003). Netzer and Biller-Andorno actually cite an article 
(Lindpaintner, 2003a) which makes this point about secondary information, yet at no 
point do they acknowledge this.  
 
Similar weak referencing can be found in other papers in the sample – for example 
Neil and Craigie [2004] who appear unwilling to cite previous literature on 
pharmacogenetics [e.g. Chadwick, 1999] published in the same bioethics journal – 
raising the question whether simple repetition (often without citation) of what others 
have already argued counts as an original argument. The point is not to single out 
these authors for criticism but rather to suggest that bioethics debates around 
pharmacogenetics are characterised by limited citation of previous authors’ 
contributions and a general acceptance of repetition as a form of originality. These 
authors are simply at one end of the spectrum.  
 
A core theme in bioethicists’ self perception is as the profession that advises the 
public on issues having to do with science and medicine.  Yet, despite that claim, in 
the case of pharmacogenetics, only a minority of bioethicists’ articles actually engage 
with making a considered argument, and of a number that do, concerns can be raised 
about the originality of their claims. It is not clear whether these issues around citation 
of previous authors’ work are limited to the discourse around pharmacogemnetics or 
are characteristic of wider bioethics debates. 
 
Discussion 
The nature of bioethicists’ discourse around pharmacogenetics does not conform to 
the idea that somehow they regulate or challenge scientific discourse and practice, or 
that they identify new ethical issues associated with this technology. Rather, it seems 
as if bioethicists have tended to provide broad but ‘thin’ reviews of potential ethical 
issues within the boundaries of ethical discourse set by academic and industry 
scientists, and have tended to avoid putting forward arguments for or against 
particular ethical positions. The question remains why this should be the case.  
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One possible element is pharmacogenetics itself, an expectation-heavy, industry-rich 
research topic coming to prominence in the late 20th Century. In the wake of the 
human genome project and controversies such as GM Food, scientists are acutely 
aware of the importance of ethical debates around new technologies. As a result, 
scientists have seen the need to discuss and debate the ethical issues surrounding 
pharmacogenetics from the very beginning of recent interest in this area in the mid- to 
late-1990s. They also have the advantage of being able to discuss these issues in 
scientific reviews as well as bioethics articles, giving them considerable influence 
over the shape of the discourse. One consequence of this is that by the time 
bioethicists became aware of this new research area and began to think about the 
issues it might raise, scientists had already ‘mapped out’ limits to the ethical 
discourse, leaving bioethicists trailing in their wake.  
 
This explanation has much to recommend it, fitting neatly with industry scientists’ 
acute sensitivity to the need to distance pharmacogenetics from the GM food debacle 
(e.g. Roses, 2000: 1361. See also Millstone, 2000) and with the important role ethics 
seems to be playing in the creation and maintenance of expectations in this area 
(Hedgecoe and Martin, 2003). Yet it does not explain why bioethicists are willing to 
accept without question scientists’ statements about the future development of 
pharmacogenetics. It is quite clear that bioethicists can be sceptical of these scientific 
claims. It is just that they are not. Nor is it clear why bioethicists seem to be content 
for their discourse to remain within its current parameters, and are so unwilling to 
think in novel ways about the ethical issues raised by pharmacogenetics.  
 
It is possible that aspects of bioethics as a discipline have also contributed to the way 
in which the ethical discourse around pharmacogenetics has developed, for example 
the unclear nature of what counts as an original contribution in bioethics. Of course, it 
would be relatively easy for bioethicists writing about pharmacogenetics to decide to 
actually argue for particular positions, to see what others have said, analyse their 
arguments, point out the weaknesses and make a case for a particular point of view, 
and as has been made clear, some authors have done this. Journals could encourage 
this by asking authors to clearly state, either in their cover letter or the article itself, 
what their original contribution is. In addition, a comprehensive review would help 
‘horizon scanning’ in that it would identify the issues that have already been raised by 
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other authors and highlight possible ‘gaps’. In addition, review articles should not be 
dismissed in themselves as unoriginal, since it is clear that, in the scientific literature 
at least, they produce original arguments and interpretations of results (Myers, 1990, 
1991; Sinding, 1996). The point is to attempt a degree of comprehensiveness to the 
review, detecting themes that run through it and providing a critical appraisal, rather 
than simply cherry-picking a few references (if at all). A critical review of this 
literature does exist [Moldrup, 2001]; almost inevitably it is written by a scientist. 
 
From this single case study, it cannot be argued that these features of bioethics’ 
scholarly standards are true of the discipline as a whole (although they are true of 
articles on pharmacogenetics published in mainstream bioethics journals), nor is it 
clear where these standards originate. It may be a feature of bioethics’ putative 
interdisciplinarity and relative youth, that standards have not had the time to develop, 
and that no one discipline’s scholarly standards dominate. Alternatively, perhaps 
bioethics’ standards are rooted in a single discipline, philosophy, where perhaps there 
is no tradition of formal literature reviews, and where the making of a case from 
scratch (even a case that has been made before), counts as original. Interestingly, the 
current debate within bioethics over the discipline’s quality places the blame squarely 
at the feet of those who seek to move bioethics away from its philosophical roots 
towards a more interdisciplinary character, a move that threatens, it is claimed, the 
philosophical rigour of bioethical debate (Benatar, 2006; Schüklenk, 2006; 
Williamson, 2008). It is paradoxical then that it is those authors who most obviously 
conform to this philosophical ideal (in terms of background and approach) who offer 
the least in terms of rigour, originality and depth when it come to discussing the ethics 
of pharmacogenetics. 
 
Finally, beyond the limited realm of pharmacogenetics and the internal features of 
bioethics as a discipline lie explanations that derive from bioethics’ status as a form of 
non-legal regulation, most obviously, the concept of ‘regulatory capture’, the almost 
inevitable process by which over time, regulators begin to share the ideas, beliefs and 
goals of the group they are meant to be regulating. This need not be the result of 
financial control, though this may be a powerful factor in the case of bioethics as 
whole (Elliott 2004). As Tina Stevens has shown, the Hasting’s Center itself, the 
institution co-founded by Daniel Callahan to tell scientists and doctors that ‘You’re 
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playing in a public ball-park now...and you’ve got to live by certain standards...like it 
or not’, underwent just such capture early in its existence (Stevens, 2000. See also 
Stemerding and Jelsma, 1996).  
 
While financial muscle is a powerful driver for regulatory capture, it is not clear it has 
explicitly driven the shape of bioethics’ discourse around pharmacogenetics, since the 
funding of bioethicists’ work in this area is varied (i.e. not always from government 
funding agencies). Rather, it seems as if in the case of pharmacogenetics, the 
regulatory capture taking place is intellectual. As John Evans has pointed out, 
bioethics as a discipline, and much of its reasoning, was created to serve the interests 
of scientists working on human genetic engineering (Evans, 2000). This kind of 
intellectual regulatory capture is clear when, for example, the bioethicst John 
Robertson suggests that ‘Proper attention to informed consent and the privacy of PGx 
[pharmacogenetic] test samples and results is essential for the smooth assimilation of 
PGx into clinical practice’, with no question that there should be a ‘smooth 
assimilation of PGx into clinical practice’ [Robertson, 2001: 209].  
 
Bioethics’ tendency to avoid fundamental debates about the construction of 
technologies leads to its inherent interest in the application of technologies. In the 
case of pharmacogenetics, this has led to an acceptance of scientists’ technical and 
ethical expectations, however easily open to question such expectations are (for 
example the role of pharmacogenetics in dealing with ADRs as a public health threat). 
This need for technologies to exist, even if only in a promissory sense, before their 
ethical aspects can be debated, has led bioethicists to avoid discussion of issues 
beyond the pre-constructed discursive boundaries. 
 
While the argument in this paper remains restricted to debates around a specific 
technology, I wish to suggest that thinking in terms of socio-technical expectations 
may help explain recent features of wider bioethical thinking. As Carl Elliott  notes: 
‘It was not that long ago that the default stance of bioethics was a suspicion of 
medical and institutional authority. As new medical technologies appeared in 
hospitals…bioethicists asked whether these technologies…were actually a 
means of dehumanization…[Yet]…More and more often we hear from 
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bioethicists who are not just pro-technology but much more fervently pro-
technology than the public at large’ (Elliott, 2005:21). 
I would like to speculatively suggest that the changes in bioethics noted by Elliott are, 
partly at least, driven by socio-technical expectations, bioethics’ apparent need for 
such expectations to come to fruition (to justify the need for ethical debate), and the 
way in which acceptance of scientists’ expectations smooths the way for acceptance 
of scientists’ beliefs about the  ethical impact of such expectations. 
 
Be that as it may, in the case study presented here, the confluence of these three 
themes – the timing of pharmacogenetics, the internal issues around quality in 
bioethics, and regulatory capture – has produced a debate about the ethics of 
pharmacogenetics that sticks within strict boundaries and which serves to support the 
kinds of expectations being generated about this technology by industry and academic 
scientists. Drawing on wider ideas within STS, we can place bioethicists at the bottom 
of  Donald MacKenzies’ ‘certainty trough’ with those people ‘committed to the 
institutional and research programme’ who are not directly involved in research but 
who may well use, comment on or mange its results, people who have low uncertainty  
about the technology concerned (MacKenzie, 1990). MacKenzie drew up the certainty 
trough in an attempt to outline people’s attitudes in his research on nuclear missile 
guidance systems, and nuclear weapons provide a useful way of thinking about 
bioethicists and the role they should play with regard to scientists’ expectations and 
hopes. In his contribution to the 1992 conference on the ‘Birth of Bioethics’ the 
medical historian Daniel Fox drew a comparison between bioethicists and civilian 
academics  researching arms control:  
‘In both defense and health...there has been a tension between professional and 
civilian control. Arms control intellectuals and bioethicists have been crucially 
important mediators between the ideologies and the technical fantasies of the 
professional on the one hand, and the most adamant and uninformed advocates 
of civilian control on the other’ (Fox, 1993: S13). 
The point of this paper has been to suggest that, in the case of pharmacogenetics, 
bioethicists are no longer questioning the ‘ideologies and technical fantasies of the 
professional’, but have largely bought into their claims, both technical and ethical. 
Whether this is a welcome state of affairs, and if not, how it can be remedied, are 
beyond the scope of this paper, yet at its best, bioethics provides a rigorous, critical 
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engagement with scientific ideas, helping policymakers, doctors and researchers think 
about the kinds of futures we can live in. A return to these values would be welcome. 
                                                 
1
 On the difference between the two terms see: Hedgecoe, 2003. This article will use the term 
pharmacogenetics.. 
2
 One possible omission from my sample are debates around the heart disease drug BiDil, which is 
licensed in the US for African Americans, supposedly because of their differing genetic make up. The 
widespread criticism of this drug centres on the way in which patients’ race has become a shorthand 
(and an inaccurate, misleading one at that) for their genotype. In line with this position, since there is 
no genetic test associated with the prescription of BiDil I reject the idea that BiDil is an example of 
pharmacogenetics (as opposed to ‘racial medicine’, or ‘personalised medicine’ or some other vague 
term), a position which is hard to argue with unless one seriously thinks that the question: ‘are you 
African-American?’ counts as a genetic test. As a result, I have excluded articles that are specifically 
focused on the BiDil case, while at the same time acknowledging that ethics articles which discuss the 
possible racializing impact of pharmacogenetics may well mention BiDil in a broader debate. 
3
 In terms of coding, truly banal recommendations (e.g. ‘there needs to be more research on the impact 
of stigmatisation’) were ignored. Borderline cases of banality, mainly the need to ‘educate’ 
professionals about pharmacogenetics were included in the coding. 
4
 One article, [Temporary Committee on Human Genetics and Other New Technologies of Modern 
Medicine 2002] listed its authors’ backgrounds as: ‘medical and social backgrounds’, and was 
excluded from this count as too vague. 
5
 Although neither Thomas [2001] nor Peterson-Iyer [2008] actually cite Lazarou and colleagues 1998 
paper, their phrasing – Thomas writes of ADRs being the ‘fourth leading cause of death’ a direct echo 
of Lazarou’s paper –  suggests that they are thinking of the 1998 meta-review of ADRs. 
6
 This last paper has been largely overlooked by both scientists and bioethicists interested in the ethics 
of pharmacogenetics, with only one bioethicist – [Lunshof, 2006] – citing it, and that in a way which 
fails to acknowledge that it does not support the idea of pharmacogenetics as the solution to ADRs 
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